These plans for a new kind of passport using credit card and biometric technology are not the plans of a banker, a commercial web systems designer, or some other corporate planner. They are plans developed by a Seattle-based Immigration and Naturalization Service officer in the United States Department of Justice. Specifically, the plans are for a card that can be used by frequent cross-border travelers in order to secure for themselves fast track border-crossings based upon pre-clearance. The cards will, in this vision, contain biometric information such as digitized hand print data that will allow machinery installed at border checkpoints to ascertain whether the cardholder is in fact the person with the pre-cleared record. Coordinating with selected foreign partners as well as collaborating with business, the plans for the card anticipate a remarkable future where borders are effectively to be policed by credit card machines owned by private companies. It is a world in which pre-cleared cardholders come and go as they please across multiple borders irrespective of their nationality (so long as they are from a country that has joined the system) and dependent only on whether they are carrying their card. The various insignia of national identity that are today inscribed on specific national passport covers would in this world be replaced by the corporate logos of transnational corporations. And, the class-organized, transnational world of credit card transactions, along with all their liberating and constraining market-mediated contradictions, would seem to come to eclipse the more equalized world of belonging regulated in the second half of twentieth century by the serial sameness of national passports.
2 This is a view of the future, then, where the ambiguities of state control and state protection associated with passports would appear to be transcended by the ambiguities of corporate control and free market flexibility afforded by credit cards. significant, but to understand them better we need particular concrete empirical cases through which to examine the changes. The argument in this paper is that the reregulation of borders and the related redevelopment of border regions provide just such opportunities for empirical study. Underpinned by popular neoliberal assumptions about the benefits of privatization and entrepreneurial policy-making, and forced through in part because of globalizing capitalism's need for speedy and flexible cross-border movement, the re-regulation of border controls involves shifts in how citizenship is both policed and imagined. Likewise, regional redevelopment plans for border regions in areas that come under continental free trade agreements commonly reflect the same increasing influence of market-oriented concepts of citizenship. In the Pacific Northwest of the US, the actual plans of Hays are yet to be fully implemented. Instead, they need to be seen as part of a longer term set of trends in border re-regulation, trends that have involved two fast track border crossing systems known respectively as the 'PACE lane' and 'NEXUS'. These border re-regulation innovations need in turn to be examined in the light of specific border region redevelopment patterns. The aim in this chapter is to flesh out some of these broader trends, thereby exploring more concretely the re-making of citizenship portended in the vision articulated by Hays. While the episodic story of border re-regulation has to attend to the tidal changes in federal legislation in Washington, D.C., the account of border region redevelopment plans has to be more localized, and, in this respect it is the regional developments on the Pacific coast between the US and Canada -the district for which Hays has been an INS commissioner -that will be the main focus.
After 9/11, it may seem anachronistic to be discussing North American efforts to soften borders and speed-up border-crossing. It may also seem a strange stretch to connect such border re-regulation to the more geographical issue of border region spaces and their redevelopment. Both of these concerns can be answered together because they both centrally relate to the ways in which the emerging neoliberal norms of citizenship appear to depend on new forms of class-based inclusion and exclusion that have actually been intensified, at least in terms of border practices, since the crisis in confidence in US 'homeland' security. Long before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the concept of facilitating fast-border crossing for business traffic on the west coast was always twinned with security concerns about catching criminals and potential terrorists. In turn, this bifurcated vision of border re-regulation also always went hand in hand with the new regional redevelopment ideas for the region. These ideas will be examined at length later, save it to note here that they have been organized around the international promotion of a post-national cross-border regional concept that the local politicians, planners and think-tanks like to call 'Cascadia'. As a cross-border region, Cascadia is imagined politically, economically and culturally as a kind of neoliberal utopia destined for growth and prosperity as a gateway of global-local commerce and as a homeland for managerial class elites. It is the exclusivism of this vision that explains why it is necessary to consider the wider geographical issues surrounding cross-border regional redevelopment in conjunction with the re-regulation of the border. 9/11 has simply intensified this exclusivism along with the attendant patterns of re-coding and reimagining citizenship. The resulting reimagination of the border and cross-border region presents us with a space where distinctions are made between travelers less on the basis of their nationality and more on the basis of whether they appear to be good for 'economic security' or whether they can be deemed a threat to 'political security'. As a consequence of 9/11, then, the impetus to increase security has come together with the enduring planning vision of a business friendly cross-border region. The result, as we shall see, involves increased plans and practices of re-regulating the border that aim simultaneously at easing obstacles for business traffic while strictly securitizing everybody and everything else.
There are, of course, many complex contradictions involved in combining neoliberal freedoms with increased political security. These contradictions are telling, and much like the changing border regulations they produce and the border-region politics in which they unfold, they reveal a great deal about the contemporary transformation of citizenship. By examining them through their effects on the grounding of new assumptions about citizenship in cross-border space, the primary goal of this chapter is to register some of the complex ways in which citizenship is being recodified in an area where neoliberal commitments to public-private partnerships and free market solutions are well entrenched. My broader goal is to connect the particular reimagination of space and citizenship in Cascadia with global tendencies towards new geographical visions of community and belonging that center on nodes and networks.
By highlighting the contrasts between these visions and older geographical imaginations of belonging in territorially discrete nation-states, I seek ultimately to contribute to the wider debate over how elite post-national citizenship -what the anthropologist Aiwha
Ong calls 'flexible citizenship' -is coeval with significant transformations to the territoriality and borders of the modern nation-state. 4 While Ong herself examines the ways in which Chinese managerial elites have effectively purchased multiple citizenships and multiple passports, this study highlights tendencies that have the potential to transcend the whole regime in which national citizenship is codified and policed through national passports. Before I turn to the empirical material itself, though, a little more needs to be said about my theoretical and terminological starting points.
Citizenship and the symptoms of neoliberalism
In dealing with the diffuse and perspectival stuff of cultural norms and geographical imaginations, my method has of necessity to be open-ended and qualitative.
The focus is not on the numbers of people crossing the border, or in how many are actually being processed by the new border technologies, or in the technical specificities of any one particular plan such as that of Hays. The chapter is much more concerned with what the general innovation of new border policing strategies and new cross-border visions tell us about the changing shape of dominant assumptions about citizenship. The word 'ideology' could be used here but is not because of its misleading associations with deliberately false or propagandistic representations. That said, the main concern of the chapter is with changing ideas about citizenship, and with the ways these are complexly, yet powerfully, interwoven with real, practical changes in how the border between Canada and the U.S. is being managed. For the same reason, the case study material here is presented as a symptom, or, more precisely, as a set of symptoms of a wider set of changes. It is not a representative sample of all the borders in North America, still less of all the borders in the world. But it is a border which provides us with a remarkable window on to how citizenship is being reimagined, recodified and, therefore, remade in an era when laissez-faire, free-market capitalism has become globally dominant.
Conceptually, my starting point is the sociologist T.H. Marshall's famous midtwentieth century work on citizenship and social class.
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In this work Marshall's main concern is with how the commitments to equality that are central to modern ideals of citizenship have been historically squared with ongoing class inequalities between actual citizens. In order to answer this question, he argues it is necessary to distinguish between three different forms of citizenship that became increasingly differentiated in the context of modernity: civil citizenship (involving freedom of access to markets, the right to sell one's labor and the right to the protection of private property and contracts under the law), political citizenship (involving the rights to vote and run for office) and social citizenship (involving rights to education and other services aimed at securing a basic standard of living). Surveying the English experience, Marshall suggests that the formative historical periods for each of these types of citizenship followed one another consecutively, with civil rights expanding widely in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth. In the first two of these three 12 Indeed, in the U.S. the prospects of a more mass generalization of these rights to others seems ever more remote as post 9/11 security concerns and the widespread escalation of anti-immigration politics become increasingly dominant. It is precisely against the backcloth of these antithetical imperatives that the developments in border policing and territorial imagination in the so- applause by the assembled audience of coach tour and cruise operators who were eager to emphasize that anything the INS could do to further ease congestion at the border would be good for their businesses. They understood that the service had an important responsibility to stop, as one manager put it, the 'bad guys', but they, the folks in business suits, the 'good guys', needed all the help they could get to make the bordercrossing experience less time-consuming and less of a burdensome friction on business.
No doubt this kind of pressure to make borders more permeable for the 'good' flows (all the while distinguishing them and separating them from control of the 'bad') has been a perennial puzzle of border management since the first development of border control posts. However, the definition of the 'good' and the 'bad' in terms of business, and the starkness of the bifurcation between them would also seem to reflect the contemporary impact of neoliberalism on citizenship and the definition of belonging in North America. Becoming an American citizen may help you win a place in primary, but it is not a necessary condition, let alone a sufficient condition of belonging there.
Frequent travel, business travel, touristic travel or some mixture thereof are weighed too, and thus inclusion inexorably becomes more and more about having capital or thinking of territory and belonging in terms of capital. Indeed, the division between primary and secondary processing would seem to provide a border checkpoint corollary of the dual labor market effect that is often discussed by economic analysts of so-called post-Fordist 'flexibility'. 13 It divides a necessary and integral core population from a contingent and The system the PACE lane established was quite simple, with nothing like the hightechnology, biometric and credit-card features of the system that Hays came to outline in 1996. 15 Applicants could go through a screening process, and then, if they passed, be issued with a decal for their car that showed they were entitled to drive in the PACE lane when they came to the border. This lane had much shorter line-ups than all the other lanes, and the likelihood of a long verbal interrogation by the border guard was considerably reduced. So long as applicants were American or Canadian citizens, and so long as they were prepared to pay the relatively small fee to purchase PACE lane membership, the application process was not especially burdensome. And the result, as "Its more than a slap in the face," Alan Artibise, a key Cascadian visionary told a reporter. "It would bring business between Canada and the US to a grinding halt." 18 However, such practicalities were not noticed at the time as the bill was pushed through
Congress in a giant omnibus legislative package at the end of a long session. It was not until after a pliant President Clinton signed the act into law that the problematic and self-defeating aspects of the legislation started to become apparent.
From the perspective of PACE lane supporters and advocates of dedicated commuter lanes on other parts of the 49 th parallel, the particular offending part of the act was Section 110. 19 This section became infamous insofar as it threatened -had it ever been implemented -to instantly create the worst and slowest moving traffic jams ever experienced on the US border with Canada. On the west coast, the resulting tailbacks of traffic were anticipated to stretch all the way back to Vancouver from Blaine. They would clearly have therefore made it impossible for anyone, whether they had PACE decals or not, to get even close to the border in a hurry. Uniformity and equality would have returned through the slow moving sameness of congestion. The main reason for the expected delays was that the Section demanded that all aliens entering and exiting the US would have to file arrival and departure records. The rationale for this demand was the concern that many illegally resident aliens in the US were coming in on legal visas and then simply overstaying. The idea behind the act was to keep bureaucratic track of all such aliens thereby enhancing the capability of the INS and law enforcement agencies to track down those overstaying their visas. For PACE lane advocates, the problem with this whole section lay in the targeting of so-called 'aliens', a word long used in the US to designate the status of foreign-ness against which US citizenship and belonging is defined. Although some local Washington state representative such as Republican Jack
Metcalf did not seem to realize this as they voted for the Act, the wording 'aliens' therefore meant that the law would apply to Canadians, even if it was phobic fear about undocumented immigration from Mexico that was a driving force behind the legislation. 20 With Canadians thereby covered by the section, the Act effectively condemned the northern border to the likely delays that would be created as each and every Canadian citizen filled in the entry-exit forms at the border.
In response to the IIRAIRA the Canadian government went into a high gear lobbying effort to repeal Section 110. They wanted the northern border and Canadians to be excepted from the stringent demands of the Act. But to this the Mexican government added its own criticisms of Section 110, arguing moreover that one NAFTA signatory
should not be treated any differently from another. These inter-governmental complaints were then also complemented by Cascadia's promoters and many other neoliberallyminded groups from northern border states across the US whose view of Canadians was and is as business partners not potential illegal aliens. 21 A lobby group entitled Americans
For Better Borders was also formed, supported chiefly by the big auto companies and other transnationals like Eastman Kodak, with vested interests in moving goods across the border. These lobbies had good connections with business-oriented Republicans and Democrats, and it was not long before legislative amendment ensued. Section 110 was first put on hold, and then finally, in the early summer of 2000, it was re-written so as to be completely harmless to the status quo. Like the Canadian government, Cascadia's promoters heralded this as a success, but as they did so few noticed and none acknowledged publicly that in many ways Section 110 (along with a number of other key parts of the 1996 Act) actually represented a form of Congressional response to the call to expand the PACE program and other forms of expedited, pre-clearance type, passport processing. Obviously, the predicted impact of Section 110 was the complete reverse of this vision.
Highlighting this reversal in his critique, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont summarized the problem perfectly: "This is not Checkpoint Charlie," he said. "This is the largest unguarded frontier in the world." 23 However, a closer look at the wording of the act itself reveals how it was actually built upon the same vision of technological facilitation, preclearance data-base management and dual-tier processing that underpinned dedicated commuter lanes like the PACE lane.
SEC 110. AUTOMATED ENTRY-EXIT CONTROL SYSTEM (a) SYSTEM. Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall develop an automated entry and exit control system that will -(1) collect a record of departure for every alien departing the United States and match the records of departure with the record of the alien's arrival in the United States; and (2) enable the Attorney General to identify, through on-line searching procedures, lawfully admitted nonimmigrants who remain in the United States beyond the period authorized by the Attorney General. 24 Running through this section, as well as through the Act more generally, is an emphasis on technological solutions. The entry and exit control system would be automated, the Section dictated. Perhaps it was for this reason that the drafters of the legislation were not worried by concerns about long delays. The technology, even though there was no budget to pay for it in the Act, would somehow solve the problems by creating a dual system for border-crossers, thereby speeding up the movement of legitimate travelers while enabling a fool-proof process for identifying, detaining and deporting the illegal. Collecting all departure records might in earlier times have created enormous problems, but another techno-futuristic part of the act -Section 104 -saw this as easily addressed through new high-tech biometric systems. These systems, which were already being tested in 1996 at various US airports, effectively represented a further technologization of the sort of pre-clearance system installed with PACE.
It was in this context that Ronald Hays made his pitch for the high-technology biometric, public-private partnership, credit card solution outlined in the epigraph at the start of this chapter. 25 Hays suggested that biometric systems would simply accelerate fast track services by providing one-to-one automated inspections by machines at border and buses. 28 Reporting on the resulting traffic jams, The New York Times noted that in some areas the wait times lasted nine hours or more. 29 The economic consequences of these delays on the Ontario-Michigan border between Detroit and Windsor were still larger than those on the west coast because of the 'just-in-time' production systems run by the auto companies moving parts and vehicles across the border. Not surprisingly, the INS and Customs were asked to rectify this situation immediately, and, according to U.S.
Commissioner of Customs, Robert Bonner, were able to use 'smart border enforcement' strategies to quickly bring the waiting times back to normal.
"The Customs service immediately went to work with the auto manufactures, the state of Michigan and operators of the bridges and tunnels in Detroit to develop a plan to ease waiting times while maintaining a high level of security. We implemented a comprehensive plan in a day. Within a few days, waiting times were nearly back to normal, and just-in-time inventory systems were again operating with predictable regularity." 30 Although the economic stakes and the speed of the response were less rapid on the west coast, the same discourse of smart border enforcement and the same emphasis on working with business ultimately came to guide policy. However, in this context, the PACE lane with its simple car decals and low technology identification process, was not seen to be smart enough. Once closed, it stayed closed notwithstanding significant economic impacts and reverberating complaints. "with a constant movement of bodies and capital across state borders, it became clear that the state could not and was not interested in guaranteeing the general rights of citizenship to all those within its territorial borders. Citizenship protection, in terms of its entitlements and obligations, became increasingly uneven, selective and fragmented, not related to territory per se, but more explicitly to economic considerations. The state thus extended citizenship rights to some but not others, i.e. to those who could bring various kinds of advantages to particular state sectors either economically or in terms of state legitimacy. State protection waxed and waned depending on historical and geographical context, and citizenship itself thus began to be perceived as a strategic category that was neither universal nor timeless, but rather one that was easily and often manipulated." 42 The use of the past tense here might be read as overly hopeful, but it underlines the point that historically changing state policies produce changing citizenship formations over time.
The case of changing border enforcement policies would seem to offer an illustrative case in point. However, the story of border re-regulations related here is not just about explicit state policies. It is also about the regulatory micropractices of government and their effective production of new forms of subjectivity. These are the circulating relations of power, self-hood and state-hood that the philosopher-historian Michel Foucault once called governmentality. 43 In terms of governmentality, then, the evolving systems of border control reveal a great deal about a moment in which it would seem that the processes of producing and disciplining national subjects are being increasingly morphed into processes and disciplinary strategies that support the production and circulation of more mobile transnational subjects. In this respect, it can be further noted that the shifts that are made manifest in the changing border regime are broadly coincident with the consumerization of citizenship that the Foucauldian sociologist, Nikolas Rose associates with the marketization of disciplinary practices under neoliberalism. Cascadia is neither a place nor a feeling. It's a rite of passage, a sign of maturity. To seek this braver, newer world, a British Columbian would look not on a map, not in his shrivened or competitive heart, but in his bank account -economic man's most sacred place. 48 This placeless, accounting logic is telling for more reasons than just its virile brave new world heroism. It is also reveals a model of Cascadian belonging based squarely on the economic bottom line, a vision of citizenship as entrepreneurial calculation. For Charles
Kelly -the Canadian publisher of a magazine called The New Pacific that became the major organ of pro-Cascadian writing before it went defunct -this vision had necessarily to be understood in geographical terms as a new regional order. The cross-border region as a place of business has necessarily, he suggests, to be considered as a place also of political reorganization.
"People in the greater Northwest are moving to establish some semblance of a regional order. Movement on the political scene represents a public realization that business is more and more looking to cross border opportunities. The shift, from business transactions to policy formation, makes official what many in industry and small business have known for some time -there must be greater cooperation if the region is to both compete in international markets and harmonize the area's sometimes conflicting and counter productive policies and regulations. The benefits in the long term are obvious. In all probability, the New Regional Order will have more staying power than the much hyped New World Order." • It is an effective way to add leverage to investment strategies. The rationalization of functions corridor-wide and corridor-long can eliminate redundant activities and site them in the most cost-efficient, least disruptive locations.
• Corridor coalitions on border, trade and environmental issues can raise the Cascadia Region's profile as a competitor for funding and can achieve collateral benefits such as improvements that serve local users as well as through traffic, and border and gateway (port and airport) staffing that encourages commodity flow through congested areas.
• A Corridor context can also create an idea sharing forum that offers leverage in innovative, comprehensive use of non-capital solutions: intelligent transportation systems, telecommuting, regulatory harmonization, work rules and hours of operation at key facilities.
• Corridor co-operation can create a larger, more secure financial base that allows access to funding under the most favorable conditions. The benefits include stronger credit ratings, use of the full-range of current and evolving financial mechanisms and public-private partnerships, and the possibility of a distinctive Cascadia Corridor Corporation as a focal point for organizing the financial resources that support major investments. The result of corridor cooperation can make Cascadia one of the world's premier, cross-border regions, and define new economic, social and environmental realities for the 21 st Century. 55 This bulleted list not only illustrates the practical connections that the visionaries see between their constructions and such material matters as credit ratings and easing congestion at the border. In addition, the list of the advantages said to accrue from the critical mass and leverage of cooperation is also clearly shot through with telling appeals to the neoliberal common denominators of entrepreneurial governance. Thus eliminating redundancy, increasing cost efficiency, regulatory harmonization, public-private partnerships, are all there, as is the still more basic neoliberal inclination towards seeing all global life as one giant struggle for the survival of the fittest, which is to say, the most "premier." Ironically -and especially so given the previously noted tendency to trace Cascadia's neoliberal credentials back to a history of western alienation -much of this strategic cooperation argument is aimed precisely at the very federal governments of which Cascadians are so supposedly suspect. In the area of federal transportation funding, for example, the Cascadia Planning Group believes that applying cooperatively as a binational region will lend more credibility to its proposals for road improvements and a high-speed rail development between Vancouver, Seattle and Portland. Given the Cascadian plans already listed it should not now be too hard to imagine the sorts of citizens given pride of place in the new regional order of Cascadia. Basically they include just two main groups: hi-tech business entrepreneurs, and monied travellers.
To address the former first, the visionaries tend to argue that the business entrepreneurs will spring naturally from the bi-national Cascadian earth in much the same way as the mountains and streams that give the region its name. Dori Jones Yang, a writer for Business Week, came away from the region with the following impression. [Cascadians] have seen idealistic, if feckless, communism fall, sensible but uncaring capitalism triumph, and the dawning Information Revolution threaten to wreak as much social havoc in the twenty-first century as the Industrial Revolution did in the nineteenth. They know where they want to spend the next few decades of change, and its the same sort of place that a lot of other smart people are starting to crave: a pleasantly isolated region rich with food, water and plenty of natural resources, where they can find a good job and a nice life. That's why, although compromises will be made and growing cities will sprawl alarmingly, the dominant ethic of this region will continue to revolve around environmentalism. The New Ecotopians have seen the rest of the world. In fact they help run it. And now they've moved to the suburbs -Cascadia, that is -they'll do whatever has to be done to keep its troubles away from their neighborhood. 57 Belonging in Cascadia, in these comfy compromised terms, thus becomes envisioned in much the same way as belonging in a suburban gated community. Writ large as a crossborder landscape with hi-tech business campuses, golf courses, shopping malls, and nicely manicured gardens, the neoliberal citizenry are provided with a space through which they can move easily across borders all the while they rest assured that their regionalized idyll will remain undisturbed.
It would be wrong though to suggest that outsiders are prohibited from belonging in this bull-dozed-borders vision of Cascadia. The key is bringing in money. Thus as well as advertising its multicultural credentials as a site for Pacific Rim business, the promoters also make much of the possibilities of Cascadia as a tourism destination. The large coffee-table picture book in which Sutherland's comments appeared, for example, was also marketed as part of a wider campaign to attract more tourists to the region. 58 The book contains page after page of glossy photos of the region, from the cities to the wilderness areas, each time playing-up the similarities north and south of the border, and, throughout, advertising Cascadia as an attractive holiday destination. More than just one picture book, though, the campaign to bring more tourists to the region has been Clearly, as many of the other chapters in this volume show, international borders and border spaces are by no means the only useful empirical entry point into these questions.
And so it also worthwhile to consider here why exactly borders can be as illuminating as
Anderson and O'Dowd aver.
Much of the recent flurry of writing about borders in the social sciences and humanities has built on the basic insight that they offer revealing research windows through which to examine the changing meaning of citizenship and statehood in an era marked by the end of the Cold War, global migration, and intensified political and economic interdependencies. 61 As conspicuously tangible and observable zones, borders provide spatial laboratories where the grand abstractions of 'globalization', 'global civil society' and 'the network society' can be compared with the empirical reality of what is actually happening on the ground. 62 Of course, as soon as such research is pursued very far, though, the epistemological conceit that the border is in fact a simple ground where all the abstract flows and ties become visible is exploded. Borders too are complex abstractions, particularly insofar as they underpin the representation and consequent imagination of nation in cultural and social life. So while they do indeed function as practical checkpoints where land is fenced, goods counted, and people stopped, labeled, and sometimes killed, borders also exist as part of the complex mental mapping of nation-states disseminated in media as varied as weather maps and school textbooks. 63 As
Anssi Paasi has clearly argued in the terms of Anthony Giddens' structuration theory, this means that international boundaries lie at the heart of a reciprocal territorial dynamic between the socio-political production of space and the spatial production of society and politics. 64 Borders are the practical products of the nation-states on which they retroactively bestow an abstracted and imagined idea of contained coherence. Moreover, these reciprocal ties extend beyond the relays between representing and inspiring nationhood. As well as providing the cartographic outlines for the socio-cultural imagination of nation, borders also facilitate the more disciplinary mental-mapping of the state itself as a contained and containing abstract apparatus. In this way, they help give the 'idea' of the state its abstracted coherence as a state apart from society, all the while practically enabling state officials to go about the more messy, quotidian work of managing and policing membership in society. 65 Borders, then, are hybrid sites where the reciprocal ties between the social and cultural definition of belonging to a nation and the bureaucratic regulation of belonging to a state -ties that form the very basis of modern citizenship -are worked out and written out in space. They are places, in fact, where the generative geography dissembled by the space spanning hyphen in 'nation-state' is actually inscribed on the earth. It is primarily because of this, I think, that borders provide especially useful sites from which to examine and nuance claims about the touted disarticulation of the nation-state.
In terms of claims about disarticulation there are actually very few scholars that are willing to echo Kenichi Ohmae's famously arrogant arguments about a borderless world and the coming end of the nation-state. 66 Indeed, it seems an almost ritualistic gesture of the general texts now being written on globalization to strawman Ohmae as a tendentious extremist against whose claims the more sober reflections of social science are reflected in all their scholarly rigor. 67 However, what these general texts still share with Ohmae is an attention to the ways in which national territoriality is today being There is a shadow world of aircraft permanently aloft that share air lanes and radio frequencies with Pan Am and British Air and Air India, portaging people who coexist with tourists and businessmen. But we are refugees and mercenaries and guest workers, you see us sleeping in airport lounges, you watch us unwrapping the last of out native foods, unrolling our prayer rugs, reading our holy books, taking out for the hundreth time an aerogram promising a job or space to sleep, a newspaper in our language, a photo of happier times, a passport, a visa, a laissez-passer… We ask only one thing: to be allowed to land; to pass through; to continue… What country? What continent? We pass through wars, through plagues. I am hungry for news, but the discarded papers are in characters or languages I cannot read. The zig-zag route is the straightest. I phantom my way through three continents.
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This is a piece of fiction but it evokes the many experiences and spaces that lie beyond the neoliberal imagination. Alert to these alternatives, a truly smart border policy needs to begin imagining more global, more democratic and more inclusive models of citizenship.
1 Ronald J. Hays, "INSPASS: INS Passenger Accelerated Service System," a paper authored on 4 January 1996 that was published on a now inactive wepage of the Department of Justice. For reasons that are no doubt connected to the argument for public-private partnerships put forward here by Hays, his paper is now available -on the web at the time of revising this paper (August 12, 2002) -on the site of the "Biometric Consortium". http://www.biometrics.org/REPORTS/INSPASS.html 2 As Jane Caplan and John Torpey note in their survey of the history of modern identity cards, "the adoption of the passport regime in international travel is intimately tied to the development of citizenship rules." Jane Caplan and John Torpey, "Introduction," in Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds. 
